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"The due process of the Fourteenth Amendment 
clause to the Constitution of the United 
States entitles a DUI defendant to a reason-
able opportunity to obtain a blood test .•. 
even though the defendant has refused to 
take the breathalyzer test." 
James Woodrow Lewis 
Chief Justice 
State of South Carolina 
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DRIVER OF GETAWAY CAR ... 
GUILT BY INFERENCE 
State v. Lino, 263 SC 50, 208 SE2d 256 
On January 19, 1974, two men entered a liquor 
store in Myrtle Beach, ordered a bottle of vodka, 
then robbed the storeowner at gunpoint. 
Lino, one of the persons convicted of armed 
robbery in connection with the incident, testified 
that he drove the car used by two others to get to 
the store and getaway, after the other two had 
committed the robbery. Lino claimed that he had no 
part in the robbery, and knew nothing about it. 
On appeal from conviction, Lino argued that such 
evidence was insufficient to convict him of armed 
robbery. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction on the ground that a jury could properly 
infer from Lino's testimony that he knew of the plans 
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for the robbery and drove the other two persons to 
the store for the purpose of committing the robbery 
and of providing them a means of escape. In an 
opinion written by Justice (now Chief Justice) Lewis, 
the Court said: 
"THE FIRST OF THE SUGGESTED ERRORS IS THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION. 
"Appellant and his codefendant were charged 
with the armed robbery of the clerk in a liquor 
store at Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, between 4:00 
and 4:30p.m., on January 19, 1974. There is 
abundant evidence to sustain the conclusion that 
appeallant and his codefendant entered the store, 
purchased a pint of vodka, and then demanded that 
they be given the money in the cash register. Upon 
the refusal of the clerk to comply, one fired a shot 
and then struck the clerk over the head with a .22 
caliber pistol. When a customer entered during the 
robbery, appellant and the codefendant hurriedly 
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drove away in appellant's blue Plymouth automobile, 
taking a small amount of cash. The customer was 
able to get the license number of the Plymouth and 
through this information appellant was later 
apprehended. 
"Appellant testified and gave a slightly 
different version of the incident. He stated that 
he drove the codefendant and the latter's brother 
to the store to purchase liquor; that he parked 
across the street from the store, remaining in the 
car, with the motor running while the two brothers 
went to make the purchase. He denied that he knew 
anything about the planned robbery by the brothers 
but, when they returned to the car, he admitted 
that he drove them away from the scene while they 
were crouched in the rear seat. Appellant's 
testimony, considered in the light of the other 
facts and circumstances, strongly supports an 
inference that he, if he did not enter the store 
and participate therein in the actual robbery, 
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waited in the car while the robbery was committed 
in order to provide an escape. 
"Under either view of the record, there is 
abundant testimony to sustain the finding of the 
jury that appellant was a principal participant 
in the robbery." 
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DUI ... DUTY TO ASSIST 
DEFENDANT IN 
OBTAINING 
BLOOD TEST 
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DUI SUSPECT ... 
DUTY OF POLICE TO ASSIST IN OBTAINING BLOOD TEST 
State v. Lewis, SC, Filed Jan.6, 1976 
The defendant Lewis was arrested for DUI in 
Florence County, taken to the County jail, and was 
there asked to submit to a breathalyzer test. He 
refused, but asked that the officers assist him in 
obtaining a blood test. 
Although the defendant was permitted to use 
the telephone, the officers refused to take any 
affirmative steps to help him obtain a blood test. 
During the telephone call, the defendant made no 
effort to arrange for a blood test. He was later 
convicted for DUI. 
Upon appeal, the defendant argued that his 
conviction should be reversed because of the refusal 
of the officers to take affirmative steps to assist 
him in obtaining a blood test. 
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The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled as 
follows: 
"WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT LEWIS WAS ENTITLED 
TO A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A BLOOD 
TEST EVEN THOUGH HE REFUSED TO TAKE THE 
BREATHALYZER TEST." 
Conviction was upheld, however, since the 
defendant had been permitted to use the telephone 
... even though he had not attempted to arrange for 
a blood test during the call. The Court said that 
the permitted use of the telephone afforded the 
defendant an opportunity to obtain a test. 
The DUI defendant's right to the opportunity 
to obtain a blood test even though he had refused 
to submit to a breathalyzer test was explained by 
the Court in these words: 
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"We next treat the contention that under the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, Patrolman Harrelson was 
required to affirmatively aid Lewis in obtaining a 
blood test. Lewis argues that the failure to assist 
him thwarted his opportunity to procure evidence 
favorable to him and, thus, constituted a denial of 
due process. 
"We are of the opinion that Lewis was entitled 
to a reasonable opportunity to obtain a blood test 
even though he refused to take the breathalyzer test. 
Although §46-344 does not expressly give a person 
this right, we do not construe the statute as 
depriving a person arrested for driving under the 
influence, who refuses to take a breathalyzer test, 
of a reasonable opportunity to obtain a blood test. 
However, we do not agree that Lewis was not afforded 
a reasonable opportunity because Harrelson refused 
to affirmatively assist him. What is reasonable will, 
of course, depend on the circumstances of each case. 
-13-
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"The facts in the instant case are not in 
dispute. Lewis was given the opportunity to use 
the telephone before and after he refused to take 
the breathalyzer test. He was able, in the opinion 
of the arresting officer, to locate the name of a 
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doctor in the telephone book. On one occasion Lewis 
did make a telephone call but made no arrangements 
for a blood test. The law enforcement officers did 
nothing to prevent Lewis from obtaining a blood test. 
"We conclude under these facts that Lewis was 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain a blood ~ 
test but failed to use it. His due process rights, 
therefore, were not violated by the actions of the 
law enforcement officers." 
,.... 
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ENTRAPMENT ..• 
WHAT IS IT? 
Sherman v. US, 2 Led 2d 848 
There are circumstances in which a person may 
knowingly commit a crime ••. yet not be held legally 
responsible for his act. One such defense against 
conviction is called 'entrapment'. The United 
States Supreme Court considered such a claim by a 
defendant who had been convicted of unlawful sale 
of narcotic drugs. 
The defendant Sherman was being treated by a 
doctor for narcotics addiction. Kalchinian, a 
Government informer, was also being treated for 
addiction by the same doctor. They met at the 
doctor's office and discussed their mutual problem. 
Kalchinian, the informer, suggested that Sherman 
obtain narcotics for both. Sherman at first tried 
to avoid the issue, but finally, at Kalchinian's 
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insistence that he was suffering, obtained unlawful 
drugs on three occasions and sold them to the 
informer. Sherman was convicted for the three 
sales. On appeal ... that finally reached the United 
States Supreme Court .•• Sherman argued that he had 
been the victim of unlawful 'entrapment' by the 
Government informer. The Supreme Court agreed in 
these words: 
QUESTION TO BE DECIDED 
"At the trial the factual issue was whether 
the informer had convinced an otherwise unwilling 
person to commit a criminal act or whether 
petitioner was already predisposed to commit the 
act and exhibited only the natural hesitancy of one 
acquainted with the narcotics trade. The issue of 
entrapment went to the jury, and a conviction 
resulted. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment 
for ten years." 
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DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT 
"In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, this Court firmly 
recognized the defense of entrapment in the federal 
courts. The intervening years have in no way 
detracted from the principles underlying that 
decision. The function of law enforcement is the 
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. 
Manifestly, that function does not include the 
manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such 
that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in 
the arsensl of the police officer. However, 
"A different question is presented when the criminal 
design originates with the officials of the 
government, and they implant in the mind of an 
innocent person the disposition to commit the 
alleged offense and induce its commission in order 
that they may prosecute." Then stealth and strategy 
become as objectionable police methods as the 
coerced confession and the unlawful search. Congress 
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could not have intended that its statutes were to be 
enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.•• 
HOW ENTRAPMENT IS DETERMINED 
"However, the fact that government agents 
"merely afforded opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense does not" constitute entrap-
ment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal 
conduct was "the product of the CREATIVE activity" 
of law-enforcement officials. (Emphasis supplied.) 
To determine whether entrapment has been established, 
a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary 
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal. The 
principles by which the courts are to make this 
determination were outlined in Sorrells. On the one 
hand, at trial the accused may examine the conduct 
of the government agent; and on the other hand, the 
accused will be subjected to an "appropriate and 
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predis-
position" as bearing on his claim of innocence." 
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WHY SHERMAN CONVICTION WAS REVERSED 
"We conclude from the evidence that entrapment 
was established as a matter of law. In so holding, 
we are not choosing between conflicting witnesses, 
nor judging credibility. Aside from recalling 
Kalchinian, who was the Government's witness, the 
defense called no witnesses. We reach our conclusion 
from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's 
witnesses. 
"It is patently clear that petitioner was 
induced by Kalchinian. The informer himself 
testified that, believing petitioner to be under-
going a cure for narcotics addiction, he nonetheless 
sought to persuade petitioner to obtain for him a 
source of narcotics. In Kalchinian's own words we 
are told of the accidental, yet recurring, meetings, 
the ensuing conversations concerning mutual 
experiences in regard to narcotics addiction, and 
then of Kalchinian's resort to sympathy. One request 
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was not enough, for Kalchinian tells us that 
additional ones were necessary to overcome, first, 
petitioner's refusal, then his evasiveness, and then 
his hesitancy in order to achieve capitulation. 
Kalchinian not only procured a source of narcotics 
but apparently also induced petitioner to return to 
the habit. Finally, assured of a catch, Kalchinian 
informed the authorities so that they could close 
the net." 
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WHY ENTRAPMENT IS A DEFENSE 
"The case at bar illustrates an evil which the 
defense of entrapment is designed to overcome. The 
government informer entices someone attempting to 
avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an 
illegal sale but also into returning to the habit 
of use. Selecting the proper time, the informer 
then tells the government agent. The set-up is 
accepted by the agent without even a question as to 
the manner in which the informer encountered the 
seller. Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses 
of an innocent party and beguiles him into 
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have 
attempted. Law enforcement does not require 
methods such as this." 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK! 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK, Chapter 122: 
1976 LEGISLATION 
An act of the General Assembly (R 461), 
effective January 23, 1976, requires not only that 
copies of all search warrants issued be kept by 
the issuing judge for a period of three years from 
date of issuance, but also that another record be 
kept on each warrant for the same period of time 
containing the following information about the 
warrant: 
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1. Date and exact time of issuance. 
2. Name of person to whom warrant issued. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Name of person whose property is to be 
searched or, if unknown, description of person 
and address of property to be searched. 
Reason for issuing warrant. 
Description of article sought in the search. 
Date and time of return. 
A criminal penalty ($100 fine or 30 days) is 
provided for alteration of such records or failure 
to keep such records. 
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